Switzerland’s carbon-offset strategy faces scrutiny as Dakar project begins testing

One solar-electric Car Rapide has completed its first test drive after six years of delays. The brightly painted minibuses are a defining feature of Dakar, carrying millions of passengers while their diesel engines add exhaust to some of the city’s busiest roads. EcoCar Solaire wants to replace those engines with swappable batteries charged by solar power.

The Swiss-backed project has a large target: 1,680 vehicles, about 20% of Dakar’s fleet. Its developers say the conversion could account for 300,000 tonnes of CO2 produced in Switzerland. The first vehicle completed testing in Switzerland in August 2025 and is being prepared for shipment to Senegal.

The project matters beyond transport in Dakar. Switzerland plans to count emissions cuts achieved overseas against its own climate obligations under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. That arrangement makes the quality of each claimed tonne important. A bus must run on the promised energy source, replace measurable diesel use, and generate reductions that would not otherwise have occurred.

Mandu Dos Santos Pinto, the entrepreneur behind EcoCar Solaire, says Swiss recognition is essential for attracting investment and training Senegalese mechanics. Scaling from one tested vehicle to the full fleet will determine whether the project becomes a functioning climate programme or remains a promising prototype.

Switzerland has reached only 0.36% of its 34 million tonne foreign offset goal for 2030. Bern has signed 16 bilateral agreements under Article 6.2 and committed to sourcing up to one-third of its 2030 climate target from projects abroad. Yet the Federal Office for the Environment has approved six projects, while 28 proposals remain under evaluation.

That gap has exposed the tension between speed and credibility. Article 6 projects must demonstrate that their reductions are real, durable and transparent. The documentation, verification and negotiations can take years. EcoCar Solaire has spent six years waiting for approval, even as its developers prepare the first vehicle for Dakar.

The Swiss government tightened its procedures after criticism of the approval process and doubts about whether some projects would have gone ahead without Swiss financing. The result is a pipeline that is moving slowly while the 2030 deadline approaches.

The foreign-credit strategy also faces competition. Norway, Singapore and Japan have signed similar agreements and are seeking large volumes of credits. A small market for high-quality projects gives suppliers more leverage and leaves governments competing for reductions that meet demanding accounting rules.

Carbon credits only work if the claimed reduction is additional. That means the project must depend on the climate finance behind the credit. If a city or operator would have electrified its buses anyway, Swiss funding cannot credibly claim the entire reduction for Switzerland’s balance sheet.

This concern has already followed the Swiss programme. Alliance Sud and Fastenaktion argued that Bangkok’s electric buses would probably have been electrified by 2030 without Swiss support. The KliK Foundation, which bought the credits, called that claim speculation. A separate complaint involving a Ghana cookstove project alleged over-crediting.

The evidence from older offset systems adds pressure. A 2024 Nature study examining 2,346 Clean Development Mechanism projects found that fewer than 16% of issued credits represented real emissions reductions. Cookstove projects performed worst, with 11%. Those findings do not directly assess Article 6.2 credits, but they show why project design, baseline calculations and independent verification matter.

For EcoCar Solaire, auditors will need to establish how many diesel kilometres the converted minibuses replace, how the batteries are charged, how long the vehicles operate, and whether the project would proceed without Swiss credits. Those figures will shape the value of every claimed tonne.

The transport gains in Dakar will be local even if the accounting benefit is claimed in Switzerland. Replacing diesel engines could reduce exhaust pollution along busy routes, lower noise and create work for mechanics trained to maintain electric drivetrains. Those outcomes are separate from the number of Swiss emissions reductions that the project can legitimately generate.

The distinction matters under Article 6.2. Switzerland and Senegal must avoid double counting, with both countries recording the same reduction against their climate commitments. The bilateral agreement signed in 2021 provides the framework, while the project’s approval determines whether its reductions can be transferred as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, or ITMOs.

Dakar’s operating conditions will test the technology. The buses carry heavy passenger loads, run on congested roads and need reliable access to charging. Swappable batteries could reduce waiting time compared with fixed charging, but the system will require safe battery handling, replacement capacity and trained technicians. Solar generation must also be measured rather than assumed.

The first test vehicle offers a starting point, not evidence of fleet-wide performance. Data from its routes, energy use, maintenance and passenger service will be needed before Switzerland can assess whether the proposed 300,000 tonnes reflects actual reductions.

Bern will review progress toward its 2030 targets in 2027, with little room for weak accounting. The Federal Office for the Environment says it is working to develop the Paris Agreement carbon market and ensure access to high-quality compensation projects. That review will come as Switzerland faces criticism from across the political spectrum.

Green parliamentarian Marionna Schlatter called the strategy a “complete failure” and accused Switzerland of avoiding responsibility. Social Democratic parliamentarian Nadine Masshardt said foreign certificates often reduce less CO2 than claimed. Christian Wasserfallen of the Radical-Liberal Democrats, who supports market-based solutions, also acknowledged flaws in the current approach.

The Dakar project gives Swiss policy a concrete case to assess. It links climate finance to a visible public service, creates a measurable technology transition and has a defined fleet target. It also carries the risks that have slowed the wider programme: additionality, reliable monitoring, financing and the possibility that projected reductions exceed actual performance.

Switzerland’s credibility will depend on how it treats the results. A successful fleet conversion could demonstrate how bilateral finance supports transport improvements while producing verifiable reductions. Delays, weak data or over-crediting would reinforce the criticism that overseas certificates cannot substitute for domestic emissions cuts.